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 WHAT 1990 MEANT FOR MY COUNTRY… 
 
 By Thomas Bremer 
Thomas Bremer (Roman-Catholic) is professor of Ecumenical Theology, Eastern Churches 
Studies, and Peace Research at Münster University in Germany. His research interests include 
the Orthodox Churches in former Soviet Union and in former Yugoslavia, the relations between 
Eastern and Western Churches, and the role of church and religion in political processes. He 
has widely published on these issues; his brief history of Orthodoxy in Russia has been 
translated into English as Cross and Kremlin (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans 2013). 
 
When I started thinking about what to write in this essay, my first thought was: I am 
probably from the country that was affected most of all by the events of 1998-1990. I am 
German, and I live in Germany, the country through which the East-West-divide went, most 
visibly through Berlin in form of the wall. But after a short time, I thought of the countries on 
which I concentrate most in my research—Russia and Ukraine, on the one hand, and Serbia, 
Croatia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, on the other hand. Thirty years ago, they all belonged to 
larger countries, which do not exist anymore, the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. I do not want 
to enter a competition regarding which country was more affected, and whether the split of a 
larger country into smaller ones has a larger effect than the unification of two countries into 
one. What is important, however, is to note that in both cases of  break-ups, war was involved: 
for the years 1991-1995 in former Yugoslavia, and on a lesser level, in different regions for 
different periods of time, in the former Soviet Union, most significantly in the war still going 
on in Eastern Ukraine.  
So, I would like to concentrate on Germany, without claiming it to be the country which 
was most affected. The fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 came unexpectedly for almost 
everyone. The East German State, the “German Democratic Republic” (GDR), was in turmoil. 
The events in Soviet Union influenced it, but the GDR government did not intend to change its 
course. When Mikhail Gorbachev visited East Berlin in October 1989, he encountered a group 
of hardliners at the top of the party and of the state, and he said something to them that later 
became famous as, “Who arrives late, will be punished by life.” A month later, the Berlin Wall 
fell. 
The GDR was in a special situation. It had a neighboring, but “capitalist” German state, 
meaning that many people had contacts with people from the West—relatives who sent 
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Christmas parcels and visited, or tourists and businesspeople who came to GDR. Almost 
everywhere in the country, one could receive West German television. There was an area in 
the southeast which was too remote for reception, and which was mocked as “the valley of the 
clueless.” Ironically, the GDR government had antennas and amplifiers installed there, since 
from that region, more people applied to leave the GDR to West Germany than from the rest 
of the country—the ones who knew the Western reality at least by TV were more reluctant to 
emigrate. But when one came to West Germany, be it by escape, as a result of an approved 
application, or as a pensioner (they were allowed to leave), one immediately received West 
German citizenship with all privileges, as the West German government never accepted a 
distinct GDR citizenship but regarded everybody from there as being “German.” Any Russian, 
Bulgarian, or Pole who fled his country had to live abroad in exile. An East German lived 
simply in another part of Germany. 
Many people regarded the situation of two German states as normal, especially after 
more time passed after World War II, and among those who had no relatives in the “other” 
Germany. My own family was completely West German, we had no contacts, relatives, or 
friends in GDR, and I remember that “the German question” was of no importance for many 
of us. On contrary, we regarded our country as the “proper” Germany—visible, e.g., that 
everybody named the soccer game during the 1974 World Championship as “Germany vs. 
GDR.” Other people, of course, had closer connections to the other state. 
What was the role of the churches? The situation of the churches in GDR was special. 
They had found a niche for their existence and within that niche had certain privileges—some 
Christian holidays were state holidays, on Sundays there was a worship service broadcast over 
the radio, and the churches could train their clergy independently of the state. Of course, there 
was no full freedom of expression and of movement among church members, and active church 
members encountered discrimination. Thus, the regime succeeded in drastically diminishing 
the number of church members. In the years before the political changes, the Protestant Church 
offered space for alternative and opposition groups who fought for civil rights, for a clean 
environment, and against militarization of the society. During the events of late 1989, many 
pastors played an important role, so that in the last GDR government, the only one which was 
democratically elected and which was in charge for only a couple of months in 1990, from the 
free elections until the unification of the two German states, several ministers were pastors, 
including the foreign minister and the defense minister.  
After the formation of the new united German state, all regulations concerning churches 
in Western Germany became valid for the whole country: religious institutions in public 
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schools, army chaplains, church taxes. However, the Eastern part of Germany was basically a 
secular state. Only a minority consisting of some 30 percent of the population belonged to a 
church. In some areas it was even much less. This trend continued during the following years. 
As of today, each of the six East German cities with more than 200,000 inhabitants (except 
Berlin) has more than 80 percent of its population who do not belong to any religious 
community. Today Christians in the Eastern regions of Germany are a tiny minority. Most 
people have not left or rejected Christianity; they simply have never been religious, not even 
formally. 
In all this, there is only a small difference between the Protestant Church and the 
Catholic Church. With the exception of a few regions, the latter has always been much smaller, 
and did not play a significant role in GDR. It took part in ecumenical endeavors, but the main 
role towards the state was always played by the Protestants. The decline of religious belonging 
concerns most of all the Protestants, but it affects also the Catholics, though with a certain 
delay. 
Because many people are quitting their membership in a church, and because that 
happens with the delay mentioned in the Catholic Church, Catholics are now for the first time 
in history the majority confession in Germany. Roughly speaking, around 56 percent of 
Germany’s 81 million inhabitants are Catholics (23.6 million) or Protestant (meaning: 
Lutherans, Reformed, and United, 21.9 million), and the rest are Muslim (4.6 million), or 
belong to another church (Orthodox: 1.6 million, Free Churches and others: 2.9 million), or do 
not belong to any religious community (some 27 million). That means that more than 20 million 
belong to each of the large churches. Belonging, however, means being an official member and 
paying church tax. But less than 10 percent of these members attend a worship service on an 
average Sunday; some of them go once a year (typically for Christmas), or only for special 
occasions like weddings or funerals.  
These numbers show that the Christian churches in Germany have strong structures, but 
only a weak participation by believers. “Structures” refers to buildings, institutions (above all 
in the social realm), and not least money. The two large churches had in 2016 a church tax 
income of 11.6 billion euros (almost 13 billion US dollars)—and that is without donations and 
other forms of income (rents, interests). Absurdly, the church tax income is growing though 
church membership is declining: The tax is a percentage of the income tax, and more people 
work, and have a good income, so that the church tax share goes up. That makes the German 
churches extremely rich, whereas the commitment of people towards the churches is 
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decreasing. This situation also explains how the churches in Germany could and can 
significantly help churches in other parts of the world, among them Eastern and Central Europe. 
This is a short glance at Christianity in Germany in the last three decades, after the fall 
of the Berlin Wall and the unification. However, as we know, post hoc does not mean propter 
hoc. The situation of the churches is not a result of the political events in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s. There is an extensive debate about why such a development in Western 
Christianity took place; but the confrontation of the churches with modernity seems to be one 
of the main reasons. Believing and belonging to a church (and in Europe that meant mostly to 
an established church) is no longer a given, as it used to be for many centuries. The churches 
have to justify their doctrines and guidelines, even their existence, and to give reasons for them. 
It took them a long time to understand that—some representatives of churches doubt it even 
today. But it is the condition in which churches in Europe live today, or, to put it in more 
religious terms, the condition into which God has placed the churches in our times. 
If this assumption is true, it means that the churches in Central and Eastern Europe quite 
soon will be confronted with the same challenges which the West and North European churches 
experienced decades ago. It is questionable, or rather doubtful, whether churches can learn 
from each other. In East European churches, one can sometimes hear the assumption that they 
will try to avoid modernity. That will be not feasible; one cannot avoid a historical 
development, as one cannot avoid the weather. But one can prepare for it. One also can see a 
chance for the churches in the current situation. Whether the churches in East and Central 
Europe will learn, or whether they will have to go through the same painful experiences—
history will show. It might well be that the Great Transformation will have severe consequences 
for them. For Germany, it was a unique chance to become a “normal” country, with all positive 
and negative consequences. 
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